The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitabality enhancing reallocation: evidence from Colombia by Eslava, Marcela et al.
 
 
 
 
Economics Division 
School of Social Sciences 
University of Southampton 
Southampton SO17 1BJ 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Papers in 
Economics and Econometrics 
 
 

6*''(('%651(5647%674#.4'(14/5
10241&7%6+8+6;#0&241(+6#$+.+6;
'0*#0%+0)4'#..1%#6+10'8+&'0%'
(41/%1.1/$+#


/CTEGNC'UNCXC
,QJP*CNVKYCPIGT
#FTKCPC-WINGT
/CWTKEG-WINGT

0Q



This paper is available on our website 
http://www.socsci.soton.ac.uk/economics/Research/ Discussion_Papers The Eﬀects of Structural Reforms on
Productivity and Proﬁtability Enhancing
Reallocation: Evidence from Colombia∗
Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Adriana Kugler and Maurice Kugler†
May 24, 2004
Abstract
Estimates for the U.S. suggest that in some sectors productivity en-
hancing reallocation is the dominant factor in accounting for producitivity
growth. An open question is whether reallocation is always productivity
enhancing. Speciﬁcally, in developing countries, market concentration, or
barriers to competition, may imply that the reallocation process is not
fully eﬃcient. Using a unique plant-level longitudinal dataset for Colom-
bia for the period 1982-1998, we use plant-level quantities and prices
to implement a novel sequential methodology to estimate productivity
and demand shocks at the plant level. First, we estimate total factor
productivity (TFP) with plant-level physical output data, where we use
downstream demand to instrument inputs. We then turn to estimating
demand shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, using TFP to
instrument for output in the inverse-demand equation. Market reforms,
introduced in the early 1990’s, are associated with rising overall produc-
tivity that is largely driven by reallocation away from low- and towards
high-productivity businesses. Our evidence also points to allocation of ac-
tivity across businesses being less driven by demand factors after reforms.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F43, L16, O14.
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11 Introduction
Market economies are continually restructuring in response to changing condi-
tions. The burgeoning evidence from longitudinal micro business databases has
shown that productivity growth at the aggregate level is closely connected to
the eﬃciency of the economy at the micro level to allocate outputs and inputs
across businesses. That is, a large fraction of measured productivity growth is
accounted for by more productive expanding businesses displacing less produc-
tive contracting businesses.1
These issues loom especially large in developing economies — although, they
have hardly been settled in advanced economies. In developing economies, there
are potentially a variety of barriers to promoting eﬃcient ongoing reallocation.
These barriers might stem from distortions in market structure as well as the
market institutions and policies in place. Aware of the impediments that distor-
tionary policies may place on reallocation and, more generally, on productivity
growth, during the past decade Latin American countries have undertaken a
whole series of reforms (including, labor, ﬁnancial, and trade reforms) to pro-
mote ﬂexibility.
In this paper, we characterize the evolution of the distributions of productiv-
ity and other determinants of proﬁtability such as demand factors in Colombia,
one of the Latin American economies that underwent extensive structural re-
forms in the early nineties. The role of productivity vs. other components of
proﬁtability is critical in evaluating the market-oriented reforms in Latin Amer-
ica since the reforms were intended to enhance the role of productivity and
perhaps reduce the role of demand factors (especially to the extent to which
markets were artiﬁcially imperfectly competitive) in the allocation of activity.
We examine the relationship between the allocation of activity, on the one hand,
and productivity and demand factors on the other.2 We then ask how this rela-
tionship changed after market reforms were introduced in Colombia in the early
1990’s.
Colombia is a superb country to study these issues for two reasons. First,
Colombia underwent a substantial and relatively fast market reform process,
mainly in 1990 and 1991. The 1990 labor market reform, which introduced
individual severance payments savings accounts, reduced dismissal costs by be-
tween 60% and 80% (Kugler (1999, 2004)). The 1991 trade liberalization
reduced the average tariﬀ from over 62% to around 15% (Lora (1997)). The ﬁ-
nancial reform ﬁrst introduced in 1990 and extended in 1991, liberalized deposit
rates, eliminated credit subsidies and modernized capital market and banking
legislation (Lora (1997)). In addition, restrictions on inﬂows of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) were removed in 1991 as multinational ﬁrms were given national
1F o rt h el a b o rm a r k e t ,t h ee ﬃcient churning of businesses implies a need to reallocate jobs
at a high pace without long and costly spells of unemployment. The latter is important for
not only productive eﬃciency of the economy but also obviously important for welfare.
2In our analysis, we focus on some of the main determinants of proﬁtability, including
productivity, demand and output prices. There are other determinants of proﬁtability, such
as costs, which are not the focus of our present analysis.
2treatment (Kugler (2000)). The 1993 social security reform allowed voluntary
transfers from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully-funded system with individual
accounts, though it increased employer and employee pension contributions up
to 13.5% of earnings (Kugler and Kugler (2003)).
Second, Colombia has unique longitudinal microeconomic data on busi-
nesses. A unique feature of the Colombian data is that both plant-level quan-
tities and prices can be measured. The ability to measure plant-level prices of
both outputs and inputs is potentially very important in this context for both
measurement and conceptual reasons. Much of the existing literature measures
establishment output as revenue divided by a common industry-level deﬂator.
Therefore, within-industry price diﬀerences are embodied in output and pro-
ductivity measures. Moreover, if prices reﬂect idiosyncratic demand shifts or
market power variation rather than quality or other diﬀerences in product at-
tributes, then high “measured” productivity businesses may not be particularly
eﬃcient. In this sense, the relationship between productivity and reallocation
in the literature may be misleading.3
In the context of a developing economy undergoing structural reforms these
measurement and conceptual issues are especially important. A key objective
of structural reforms is to make markets more competitive. Without the ability
to measure plant-level prices it is very diﬃcult to quantify and, in turn, analyze
the respective contributions of demand and eﬃciency factors in the allocation
of activity and how they may have changed in response to market reforms.
In this paper, we attempt to measure the separate inﬂuences of idiosyncratic
productivity and demand on the allocation of activity in Colombia.
In exploiting these unique micro data, our paper makes a number of re-
lated methodological innovations relative to much of the literature. First, in
measuring eﬃciency we estimate production functions using an extension of the
instrumental variable approach pioneered by Shea (1993) and Syverson (2003).
In the latter, Syverson uses local downstream demand instruments to estimate
returns to scale of production functions. Building on this approach, we use
downstream demand instruments as well as plant-level input prices for materi-
als and energy as instruments in estimating production functions. From this
structural estimation of production functions, we generate measures of plant-
level eﬃciency (i.e., plant-level total factor productivity). Second, since we
can measure plant-level output prices, we estimate demand elasticities using
the total factor productivity estimates as instruments in the demand equations.
That is, we ﬁrst use downstream demand instruments to estimate production
functions and then use supply shocks (i.e., total factor productivity) to estimate
3Since Marschak and Andrews (1944), there has been awareness about the possible diﬃcul-
ties involved in using revenue-based deﬂated output in establishment level data. Klette and
Griliches (1996) consider how intra-industry price ﬂuctuations can aﬀect production function
and productivity estimates. Melitz (2000) explores this problem further and extends the anal-
ysis to consideration of multi-product producers. Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2003) argue
that both revenue-based output and expenditure-based input measures can lead to productiv-
ity mismeasurement and incorrect interpretations about how heterogeneous producers respond
to shocks and the associated welfare implications. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003)
use plant-level data on quantities and prices for the U.S. to study market selection dynamics.
3the demand functions.
Having estimated production and demand functions, we study the evolu-
tion of the distributions of total factor productivity, demand shocks, and prices
through the market reforms in Colombia. We ﬁnd that aggregate TFP is higher
after the reforms. Moreover, the dispersion of TFP also rises after the reforms.
Our main focus though is on the allocation of activity and its relationship to
TFP and demand shocks in Colombia throughout the entire period as well as
during periods prior to and subsequent to the reforms. Overall, we ﬁnd that
the allocation of activity reﬂects both eﬃciency and demand factors. That is,
market shares are higher for businesses that are more eﬃcient and face higher
demand. Following the reforms, we ﬁnd that eﬃciency factors become more
important in the allocation of activity across businesses while demand factors
become less important. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the rising aggregate pro-
ductivity in Colombia over this period is accounted for almost entirely by the
improved allocation of activity across businesses.
At the extensive margin, we also ﬁnd that exiting businesses are less eﬃ-
cient and face lower demand for their products relative to incumbents. On the
other hand, entering businesses are more eﬃcient than incumbents and exiting
businesses, but also face lower demand relative to incumbents. This ﬁnding
points to the importance of vintage technology relative to learning to account
for productivity dynamics. Note that revenue-based TFP measures spuriously
include a demand component and thus underestimate technical eﬃciency of en-
trants, who have to build a consumer base, relative to incumbents, who have a
established clientele. Hence, the analysis in the present paper provides a better
basis to discern between vintage and learning explanations for dynamics and
heterogeneity in productivity.
How did these patterns change in response to the market reforms? Af-
ter the market reforms, the positive gap between the productive eﬃciency of
the average incumbent and the average exiting business rises but the positive
gap between the productive eﬃciency of the average entering business and the
average incumbent declines. On net, the contribution of entry and exit to aver-
age productivity rises slightly. Moreover, when we investigate a more dynamic
speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that, after the reforms, entrants exhibit slightly higher
productivity than incumbents . There is also evidence of learning eﬀects in
the post-reform period. Putting these pieces together suggests market reforms
yielded a more heterogenous group of entrants but that conditional on survival
the post- reform entrants contribute more to productivity. Increased learn-
ing by entering businesses after the reforms may be due to increased access to
new imported capital vintages and increased access to know-how from foreign
businesses. These patterns are also consistent with greater selection by the mar-
ket of the least productive and proﬁtable businesses after foreign competition
was increased, access to subsidized credit was reduced, and dismissal costs were
lowered following the reforms.
Before proceeding, it is useful to emphasize that the welfare implications
(and even the productivity implications) are complex in this context with im-
perfect competition. Our paper is intended to be a contribution on charac-
4terizing the positive implications of market reform rather than the normative
implications. There are several interesting complicating factors in considering
welfare implications. For one, the market power of ﬁrms may derive from eco-
nomic fundamentals or from institutional factors. For example, it may be that
market power derives from product diﬀerentiation by each producer and that
markets are best characterized by monopolistic competition. The exploitation
of market power in this context by ﬁrms still generates a welfare loss with prices
being above marginal cost, but even in the absence of markups substantial price
heterogeneity across ﬁrms would still be a feature of a ﬁrst-best equilibrium.
Alternatively (or in addition), market power may derive from institutional bar-
riers (e.g., trade restrictions). Simple intuition suggests that elimination of such
barriers will improve welfare, but even here one should be cautious given po-
tential second-best considerations. Another related complicated factor is that
market power may play an important role in product and process innovations
that lead to technological progress. In some creative-destruction models of in-
novation and growth (e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992)), market power plays an
important role for innovators in an environment in which there are ﬁxed costs
of innovation. We do not have much to say directly about this latter class
of models since we do not directly investigate the role of product and process
innovation. Part of the reason for this is that our empirical focus is on oper-
ating plants in manufacturing (not R&D facilities). Our analysis has more to
say about heterogeneity resulting from diﬀerences in adoption rather than in-
novation. However, a long standing issue in the empirical innovation literature
is how much innovation occurs in R&D facilities and how much occurs on the
factory ﬂoor.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Colombian
context and the market reforms undertaken during the period of study. Section
3 describes the unique data we use in this analysis. Section 4 describes our
methodology for estimating plant-level total factor productivity and demand
shocks, and presents the results of these estimations. Section 5 describes basic
patterns of productivity, demand, and prices in terms of dispersion and persis-
tence. Section 6 examines the relations between eﬃciency and demand, on the
one hand, and the allocation of activity, on the other hand, both before and
after the reforms. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 Market Reforms in Colombia
In 1990, the administration of President Cesar Gaviria conceived a comprehen-
sive reform package, which included not only measures to modernize the state
and liberalize markets but also a constitutional reform. In contrast to the expe-
rience in many reformist countries, there was no underlying economic crisis pre-
ceding the reform in Colombia. Rather, ample social and political unrest were
the catalysts for institutional change (see, e.g., Edwards (2001)). Structural
reforms to remove distortions from product and factor markets were introduced
in parallel with constitutional changes to political institutions as part of a wider
5eﬀort to control internal strife associated with violent activities of both illicit
drug cartels and guerrilla groups. The absence of an economic crisis meant that
there was no clear consensus for the need of market-oriented reforms, but at the
same time good economic conditions were initially an asset as distributive con-
ﬂict was addressed by elaborate resource transfer schemes (see, e.g. Kugler and
Rosenthal (2003)). However, the inability to reconcile market oriented reforms
with the continued and pervasive need for redistribution to compensate losers
m e a n tt h a tb y1 9 9 3t h es p u r to fr e f o r mo ft h ee a r l yn i n e t i e sc a m et oah a l t .
Although there was no reversal of reforms, Colombia did not make additional
progress in terms of further removing distortions while many other countries
in Latin America, and around the world, actually deepened reform eﬀorts (see,
e.g., Burki and Perry (1997)). The fact that the structural reform process in
Colombia was a one-oﬀ phenomenon aids our identiﬁcation strategy in trying
to assess its impact on the relation between reallocation and productivity.
Before Gaviria’s administration, the government of President Virgilio Barco
made some partial progress in trade liberalization but did not gain any signif-
icant ground in removing other distortions. The gradual decrease in tariﬀs
initiated by Barco was accelerated by Gaviria after June 1991. By the end of
1991, nominal protection reached 14.4% and eﬀective protection 26.6%, down
from 62.5% a year earlier, while 99.9% of items were moved to the free import
regime. These measures clearly generated unrest among the owners of capital,
who faced lower proﬁt margins after trade liberalization due to increased foreign
competition. The impact from market penetration by foreign exporters, and by
foreign investors as pointed out below, on the market participation of domestic
businesses in product markets was mitigated by more favorable conditions in
factor markets, which lowered both capital and labor costs. In labor markets,
Law 50 of December 1990 promoted the ﬂexibilization of contracts and reduced
labor costs by between 60% and 80% (see, e.g., Kugler (1999, 2004)) . In 1990,
the government also tried to introduce changes in the social security system as
part of the labor reform package, but Congress forced an independent process
to reform pension provision. The opposition to the original reform plan by the
Executive stemmed partly from the proposal to lower labor costs by reducing
employer’s contributions. Later during the Gaviria administration, the execu-
tive compromised with Congress by passing Law 100 in 1993. Although Law
100 allowed for voluntary individual conversion from a pay-as-you-go system to
a fully-funded system with accounts, this law also introduced a mandatory hike
in employer and employee contributions up to 13.5% of salaries, of which 75%
was paid by employers (see, e.g., Kugler and Kugler (2003)).
A number of measures also reduced frictions in ﬁnancial markets. In 1990,
Law 45 was introduced with the goal of reducing state control and ownership
concentration in the banking sector. Interest rate ceilings were eliminated and
required reserves were reduced. At the same time, supervision was reinforced in
line with the Basle Accords for capitalization requirements, though there were
no requirements for banks to invest in government securities. Law 9 of 1991
established the abolition of exchange controls eliminating the monopoly of the
central bank on foreign exchange transactions and lowering substantially the
6extent of capital controls. Finally, Resolution 49 of 1991 eliminated restrictions
to foreign direct investment. This resolution established national treatment of
foreign enterprises and eliminated limits on the transfer of proﬁts abroad as well
as bureaucratic procedures requiring the approval of individual projects (see,
e.g., Kugler (2000)). This measure not only facilitated capital inﬂo w sa c r o s sa l l
sectors, but also induced entry of foreign banks increasing competition in the
ﬁnancial sector, thereby yielding lower intermediation costs.
After the end of Gaviria’s term, in 1994 President Ernesto Samper gained
power on a platform partially based on opposition to market institutions.4
While the new government was unsuccessful in terms of dismantling existing
reforms, the coalition supporting the new government managed to bring the
momentum for additional reforms to a halt.
Overall, though, the reform process was relatively smooth and successful in
transforming a highly distorted economy into one burdened with many fewer
frictions. Trade liberalization and the removal of FDI restrictions were aimed
at increasing competition and shifting production away from low- and towards
high-productivity businesses. In addition, the liberalization of factor markets
had the purpose of facilitating reallocation in the economy after the structural
reform process. If the goal of inducing productivity-enhancing reallocation
was achieved, its success should be reﬂected in diﬀerent patterns of industrial
dynamics between the 1980’s and the 1990’s, with market allocation being driven
to a large extent by productivity rather than proﬁtability in the latter period.
In the following sections, we investigate whether this is the case.
3D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
Our data come from the Colombian Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) for
the years 1982 to 1998. The AMS is an unbalanced panel of Colombian plants
with more than 10 employees, or sales above a certain limit (around US$35,000
in 1998). 5 The AMS includes information for each plant on: value of output and
prices charged for each product manufactured; overall cost and prices paid for
each material used in the production process; energy consumption in physical
units and energy prices; production and non-production number of workers and
payroll; and book values of equipment and structures. The dataset also provides
information on plant location as well as industry classiﬁcation codes (5 digits
CIIU).
Our aim in this paper is to estimate and describe the behavior of productiv-
ity and demand shocks in Colombia during the pre- and post-reform periods and
to document how reallocation contributed to productivity and demand increases
during the period of study and, especially, whether the relation changed after
4Note that the Colombian electoral system rules out re-election.
5In the Appendix, we describe the methodology used to generate longitudinal linkages that
allow following plants over time. As explained in the Appendix, over the period of study the
AMS underwent changes in the sampling and labeling of plants, which require very involved
work to generate these linkages and reduce spurious measurement of entry and exit of plants.
7the reforms. To this end, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) values
for each plant using a capital-labor-materials-energy (KLEM) production func-
tion and demand shock values for each plant using a standard inverse-demand
function. To estimate production and inverse-demand equations, we need to
construct physical quantities and prices of output and inputs, capital stock se-
ries, and total labor hours.
3.1 Plant-level Price Indices
With the rich information on prices collected in the AMS, we can construct
plant-level price indices for output, materials, and energy. This represents an
enormous advantage with respect to other sources of data, as the use of more
aggregate price deﬂators is a common source of measurement error, due to plant-
speciﬁc demand shocks. Prices of output and materials are constructed using
Tornqvist indices. For a composite of products or materials i of each plant j
at time t are constructed these Tornqvist indices are the weighted average of
the growth in prices for all individual products or materials h generated by the
plant. This weighted average is given by:
∆Pijt =
H X
h=1
shjt∆ln(Phjt),
where i = Y,M, i.e., output or materials,
∆ln(Phjt)=l nPhjt − lnPhjt−1,
and
shjt =
shjt + shjt−1
2
and Phjt and Phjt−1 are the prices charged for product h, or paid for material
h, by plant j at time t and t − 1, and sht and sht−1 are the shares of product
h in plant j’s total production, or the shares of material h in the total value of
plant j’s materials purchases, for years t and t − 1.6 The indices for the levels
of output (or material) prices for each plant j are then constructed using the
weighted average of the growth of prices and ﬁx i n g1 9 8 2a st h eb a s ey e a r :
lnPjt =l nPijt−1 + ∆Pijt
for t>1982, where Pj1982 = 100, and where the price levels are then simply
obtained by applying an exponential function to the natural log of prices, Pijt =
expln Pijt.7
6The distribution of the weighted average of the growth of prices has large outliers, espe-
cially at the left side of the distribution. In particular, the distribution shows negative growth
rates of 100% and more. In a country like Colombia, with inﬂation around 20%, negative
growth rates of these magnitudes seem implausible. For this reason, we trim the 1% tails at
both ends of the distribution as well as any observation with a negative growth rate of prices
of more than 50%.
7Given the recursive method used to construct the price indices and the fact that we do
not have plant-level information for product and material prices for the years before plants
83.2 Capital Stock Series
Given prices for materials and output, the quantities of materials and output
are constructed by dividing the cost of materials and value of output by the
corresponding prices. Quantities of energy consumption are directly reported by
the plant. In addition, we need capital stocks to estimate a KLEM production
function.
The plant capital stock is constructed recursively on the basis of the expres-
sion:
Kjt =( 1− δ)Kjt−1 +
Ijt
Dt
for all t such that Kjt−1 > 0, where Ijt is gross investment, δ is the depreciation
rate and Dt is a deﬂator for gross capital formation. Our measure of Dt is the
implicit deﬂator for capital formation from the input-output matrices for years
1991-1994, and from the output utilization matrices for later years. We use the
“observed” depreciation rates calculated in Pombo (1999) at the 3-digit sectoral
level, which range between 8.7% and 17.7% for machinery and between 2.4%
and 9.8% for buildings.
Gross investment is generated from the information on ﬁxed assets reported
by each plant, using the expression:
Ijt = KNF
jt − KNI
jt + djt − πA
jt
where KNF
jt is the reported value of ﬁxed assets by plant j at the end of year t,
KNI
jt is the reported value of ﬁxed assets reported by plant j at the start of year
t, djt is the depreciation reported by plant j at the end of year t,a n dπA
it is the
reported inﬂation adjustment to ﬁxed asset value by plant j at the end of year
t (only relevant since 1995, the ﬁrst year in which plants were required by law
to consider this component in their calculations of end-of-year ﬁxed assets).
The capital stock series is initialized at the year the plant enters the sample,
t0. To obtain the initial value, we use the equation:
Kit0 =
KNI
it0
0.5Dt0 +0 .5Dt0−1
,
where KNI
jt0 is the ﬁrst reported nominal capital stock at the beginning of the
year. In constructing the capital stock series we include equipment, machinery,
buildings and structures, while excluding vehicles and land.
3.3 Total Labor Hours
Finally, we construct a labor measure as total hours of employment. Since the
AMS does not have data on production and non-production worker hours, we
enter the sample, we impute product and material prices for each plant with missing values
by using the average prices in their sector, location, and year. When the information is not
available by location, we inpute the national average in the sector for that year.
9construct a measure of total employment hours at time t for sector G(j), to
which plant j belongs, as,
hG(j)t =
earningsG(j)t
wG(j)t
,
where wG(j)t is a measure of sectoral wages at the 3-digit level from the Monthly
Manufacturing Survey, and earningsG(j)t is a measure of earnings per worker
constructed from our data as
earningsG(j)t =
P
j∈G
payrolljt
P
j∈G
ljt
Then, the total employment hours measure is constructed as, 8
Ljt = ljthG(j)t,
where ljt is the total number of employees in ﬁrm j at time t.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the quantity and price variables just
described, for the pre- and post-reform periods, by continuing, entering or ex-
iting status. The table reports entry and exit rates of 9.8% and 8.7% during
the pre-reform period, but a lower entry rate of 8.4% and a higher exit rate of
10.7% during the post-reform period.9 The quantity variables are expressed in
logs, while the prices are relative to a yearly producer price index to discount
inﬂation. Output increased between the pre- and post-reform periods . Sim-
ilarly, except for labor, input use increased between the pre- and post-reform
periods. In particular, the table shows that capital, materials and energy use
increased between the pre- and post-reform periods especially for incumbents
and entrants. On the other hand, labor use decreased between the two periods
for entering and exiting plants. Relative prices of output and materials prices
declined between the pre- and post-reform periods for all plants.10
8While we observe total employment at the plant-level, we do not observe total hours. Our
method is to impute total hours per worker for plant j using the average for plants in the
same industry as plant j. A large share of the variation in total employment hours stems from
total employment variation.
9These entry and exit rates are lower than those reported for the U.S. and other OECD
countries (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)). Given that the Colombian economy is
subject to greater rigidities, one may indeed expect lower entry and exit rates in the Colombian
context (see, e.g., Tybout (2000) for a discussion of this issue).
10Caution needs to be used in interpreting the aggregate (mean) relative prices in this
context since the relative price at the micro level is the log diﬀerence between the plant-level
price and the log of the aggregate PPI. On an an appropriately output weighted basis, the
mean of this relative price measure should be close to zero in all periods (or one in levels) since
the PPI is dominated by manufacturing industries. The larger diﬀerence with respect to PPI
in the post-reform period reﬂects that the growth of manufacturing prices fell more rapidly
than that of other prices in the economy, possibly due to the fact that external competition
introduced by the reforms aﬀected the manufacturing sector more than others.
10Table 2 reports simple correlations of the various variables reported in Table
1, which display by and large the expected patterns. Output is positively cor-
related with all inputs , negatively correlated with its own price, and negatively
but weakly correlated with energy and materials prices. Inputs are positively
correlated with each other. All inputs are negatively correlated with energy
prices, except for materials. All inputs are negatively correlated with materi-
als prices, except for labor. Energy and materials use are negatively correlated
with their own prices. Also, as expected, output prices are positively correlated
with materials prices, and negatively but weakly correlated with energy prices.
Finally, energy and materials prices are weakly and negatively correlated.
In the next section, we use these variables to estimate the production func-
tion and inverse-demand equation.
4 Estimation of TFP and Demand Shocks
We estimate total factor productivity with plant-level physical output data,
using downstream demand to instrument inputs. In turn, we estimate demand
shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, using TFP to instrument for
output in the inverse-demand equation.
4.1 TFP Estimation
We estimate total factor productivity for each establishment as the residual
from a capital-labor-energy-materials (KLEM) production function:
Yjt = Kα
jtL
β
jtE
γ
jtM
φ
jtVjt,
where, Yjt is output, Kjt is capital, Ljt is total employment hours, Ejt is energy
consumption, Mjt are materials, and Vjt is a productivity shock. We estimate
this production function in logs,
logYjt = αlogKjt + β logLjt + γ logEjt + φlogMjt +l o gVjt,
so that our total factor productivity measure is estimated as:
TFP jt =l o gYjt − b αlogKjt − b β logLjt − b γ logEjt − b φlogMjt. (1)
where b α, b β, b γ,a n db φ are the estimated factor elasticities for capital, labor, en-
ergy, and materials. In addition, we estimate a value-added production function
with only capital and employment to provide a benchmark of comparison with
other studies. Whether we estimate value-added or KLEM speciﬁcations, using
OLS to estimate the production function is likely to generate biased estimates
of factor elasticities as productivity shocks are probably correlated with capital,
labor, energy, and materials. For example, the introduction of capital-biased
technologies is likely to be associated with greater use of capital and energy and
with less employment.
11We deal with this omitted variable bias by using demand-shift instruments
which are correlated with input use but uncorrelated with productivity shocks.
In particular, we construct Shea (1993) and Syverson (2003) type instruments
by selecting industries whose output ﬂuctuations are likely to function as ap-
proximately exogenous demand shocks for other industries. The instruments
are total output measures in downstream industries, or combinations of down-
stream industries, that satisfy two conditions: (1) they buy a large enough
fraction of the output generated by the upstream industry (i.e., the relevance
condition), and (2) their purchases from the output industry are a relatively
small share of their costs (i.e., the exogeneity condition). The latter condition
is important to ensure that the upstream industry is not aﬀecting the down-
stream industry, so that the instrument - downstream demand - is uncorrelated
with productivity shocks upstream. The ﬁrst condition is important to ensure
relevance of the instruments, i.e., strong correlations between the instruments
and use of inputs upstream. Following Shea (1993), we use the input-output
matrix for each year to construct instruments for the equivalent of two-digit
industries in the U.S.11 For the instruments to meet the two criteria above, we
impose that: (1) the demand share of the downstream industry for upstream
production has to exceed 15%, and (2) the cost share of the upstream industry
products in the downstream’s total costs is less than 15 percent. 12 We also use
one- and two-period lags of the demand shifters. The rationale for doing this
is that some factors, such as capital and labor, may face non-linear adjustment
costs and irreversibilities, so that demand shifts may take various periods to
aﬀect factor utilization. In addition, we use regional government expenditures,
excluding government investment, in the region where the plant is located as an
instrument to capture shifts in local demand. 13 We regard this instrument as
11We use input-output matrices from the national accounts for the pre-1994 period. For the
later years, a new methodology was put in place for the national accounts, and input-output
matrices were replaced by output-use and output-supply matrices. For these later years, we
rely on output-use matrices to determine cost and sales shares, and on output-supply matrices
to determine sectoral output. It is also important to note that input-output matrices do not
use ISIC codes to classify industries. The level at which we could create concordance is close
to the 2-digits ISIC codes.
12While Shea (1997) uses a criterion of exogeneity based on the ratio of demand share to
cost share (i.e., this ratio being less than 3), our criterion is based on absolute cost shares
(i.e., having a cost share of less than 15%). This absolute criterion is more binding than the
ratio criterion for downstream industries that represent large demand shares, and less binding
for other dowsntream industries. Using the above criteria, adding exports to the downstream
demand set and also aggregrating downstream industries to two or three industries to meet
the greater than 15% threshold, we obtain instruments for 8 of the 12 upstream industries
(i.e., Drinks and Beverages, Wood, Food, Textiles, Oil, Paper, Chemicals and Rubber, and
Glass and other non-metallic products). The 4 sectors without demand-shift instruments are
Tobacco, which makes up a very low share of sales for other industries; Metals and Machinery,
which comprise too high a share of costs when the sales share is high enough; and Other
Manufacturing, a category that includes widely diﬀerent and changing types of goods, for
which costs and sales shares are diﬃcult to deﬁne in a meaningful a consistent way.
13There may be a common component in technology shocks, although given the enormous
heterogeneity across plants the idiosyncratic component dominates. However, this common
c o m p o n e n to ft e c h n o l o g ys h o c k si su n l i k e l yt ob ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hr e g i o n a lg o v e r n m e n te x p e n -
ditures, since it takes time for government expenditures to respond to changes in the local
12particularly relevant to identify the coeﬃcient on labor, given that labor markets
in Colombia are largely region-speciﬁc. Finally, we use energy and materials
prices as instruments, which are negatively correlated to energy consumption
and use of materials, but likely to be uncorrelated with productivity shocks.
Table 3 reports results for the value-added speciﬁcation with only capital
and employment and for the KLEM speciﬁcation of the production function.
Column (1) reports the OLS results from the estimation of the value-added
speciﬁcation. The results show an elasticity for capital of about 0.3 and an
elasticity for employment of about 0.74, which are in line with other studies.
The problem with this speciﬁcation in terms of estimating total factor pro-
ductivity is, however, that it imposes implausible restrictions in terms of the
elasticity of output to energy and materials. For this reason, we estimate a
KLEM speciﬁcation which uses physical output in the left-hand side and also
includes energy and materials as inputs. Furthermore, the inclusion of energy
can help account for diﬀerent levels of capital utilization, under the plausible as-
sumption that the latter is positively correlated with the use of energy. Column
(2) presents the OLS results from the estimation of the KLEM speciﬁcation. 14
As expected, factor elasticities for capital and labor become smaller, as energy
and materials are allowed to impact output in a nonlinear fashion. The results
now suggest elasticities for capital, labor, energy, and materials of about 0.08,
0.24, 0.12, and 0.59, respectively.
However, as pointed out above, these elasticities are likely to be biased if
productivity shocks are correlated with input use. Columns (3) and (4) of
Table 3 present results using 2SLS estimation, which rely on the current and
lagged demand-shift instrument, regional government expenditures, and input
prices. Even if we think these instruments are weakly correlated with pro-
ductivity shocks, large biases could be introduced when using IV estimation if
instruments are weakly correlated with the inputs. 15 To check whether inputs
economy. Moreover, although certain types of government expenses can constitute aggre-
gate productivity shocks (e.g., construction of road ways), these are likely to show up in the
investment side of the government accounts. This is the reason why we use regional gov-
ernment expenditures, excluding government investment, as an instrument. It is also worth
emphasizing that results in the remainder of the paper are robust changing this instrument to
total regional government expenditure (which includes government investment), and even to
state GDP. That is, we obtain virtually the same results for the estimation of the production
functions and all the results that depend upon our TFP and demand shock estimates. Most
results are also robust to the exclusion of this instrument but, as we expected, the coeﬃcient
of labor hours is very imprecisely estimated in this case, and even has the wrong sign.
14The increase in the number of observations from Column (1) to Column (2) (and also
from Column (3) to Column (4)) is due the fact that Column (1) uses the log of value-added
while Column (2) uses the log of physical output as the dependent variable. Observations are
lost in the value added speciﬁcation because the level of value added takes negative values in
some cases.
15We also considered longer lags and exponential terms of the demand-shifters as well as
other measures of regional shocks, including total regional government expernditures and state
GDP. The results reported here are largely robust to these changes in the list of instruments.
To select our baseline instruments, we tested for overidentifying restrictions using a variant
of Basmann’s (1960) test, where we estimate a regression of the production function residual
on the instruments. While lags of more than two periods and exponential terms of the
13are highly and signiﬁcantly correlated with the instruments, Table 4 reports
results for the ﬁrst-stages of the inputs on the various instruments. The results
suggest use of energy and materials increases signiﬁcantly with downstream de-
mand, but employment hours decrease signiﬁcantly with downstream demand.
Moreover, capital, energy use and materials are negatively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the one-period lag of downstream demand, and all inputs are
positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the two-period lag of downstream de-
mand. Regional government expenditures are positively and strongly correlated
with capital and labor and negatively correlated with materials and energy con-
sumption. Also, as expected, materials and energy prices signiﬁcantly reduce
energy consumption and use of materials and capital, respectively. Given that
we are considering instrument relevance with multiple endogenous regressors,
we report the partial R2 measures suggested by Shea (1997) for the ﬁrst-stages,
which capture the correlation between an endogenous regressor and the instru-
ments after taking away the correlation between that particular regressor with
all other endogenous regressors.16 The partial R2’s for capital, employment
hours, energy, and materials in the KLEM speciﬁcation are 0.1276, 0.139, 0.231,
and 0.324, respectively, and 0.2563 and 0.1324 for capital and employment in
the value-added speciﬁcation, showing that the relevant instruments for each
input can explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the use of that input.
The IV results for the value-added speciﬁcation in Column (3) of Table 3
show larger capital and employment elasticities relative to the OLS estimated
elasticities. The results in Column (4) of Table 3 also show larger elasticities
for capital and energy, but smaller elasticities for labor hours and materials,
when inputs are instrumented.17 The results from the value-added and KLEM
speciﬁcations, thus, indicate that productivity shocks during the period of study
are positively correlated with hours and materials and negatively correlated with
capital, employment and energy, suggesting the adoption of hour-intensive and
energy-saving technologies in Colombia during the 1980’s and 1990’s.
demand shifters turn out to be signiﬁcant in these regressions, the rest of our instruments
are individually and jointly insigniﬁcant. We restrict our instrument list to include those
instruments which are not jointly signiﬁcant in this regression. Although regional government
expenditures (excluding government investment), total regional government expenditures, and
state GDP all turn out to be insigniﬁcant in this regressions, we rely on regional government
expenditures (excluding investment) for the reasons pointed out in Footnote 13.
16The standard R2 simply reports the square of the sample correlation coeﬃcient between
Ijt and ˆ Ijt,w h e r eI = K,L,E,M and ˆ Ijt are the predicted values of the inputs from a regres-
sion of Ijt on the instruments. The partial R2 reports the square of the sample correlation
coeﬃcient between gjt and b gjt,w h e r egjt are the residuals from an OLS regression of Ijt on
all other inputs I1jt and b gjt are the residuals from an OLS regression of ˆ Ijt on the predicted
values of all other inputs ˆ I1jt.
17The value-added speciﬁcation ignores changes in labor utilization. If technology shocks
are negatively correlated with employment but positively correlated with labor hours, this
would explain why the elasticity of labor increases when the value-added speciﬁcation is in-
strumented, while the elasticity of labor hours falls when the KLEM speciﬁcation is instru-
mented.
144.2 Estimation of Demand Shocks
While productivity is likely one of the crucial components of proﬁtability, other
components of proﬁtability are also probably important determinants of reallo-
cation. For example, even if plants are highly productive, they may be forced to
reduce their market shares if faced with large negative demand shocks. We cap-
ture the demand component of proﬁtability by estimating establishment-level
demand shocks as the residual of the following inverse-demand equation:18
Pjt = Y −ε
jt Djt,
where Djt is a demand shock faced by ﬁrm j at time t and −ε is the inverse of the
elasticity of demand and 1+ε is the mark-up. We estimate this inverse-demand
function in logs,
logPjt = −εlogYjt +l o gDjt,
and our demand shock measure is estimated as the residual from this regression,
djt = d logDjt =l o gPjt +b εlogYjt, (2)
where −b ε is an inverse measure of the elasticity of demand. Using OLS to
estimate the inverse-demand function is likely to generate an upwardly biased
estimate of demand elasticities because demand shocks are positively correlated
to both output and prices, so that b ε will be smaller in absolute value than the
true ε. To eliminate the upward bias in our estimates of demand elasticities, we
propose using TFP as an instrument for Yjt since TFP is positively correlated
with output (by construction) but unlikely to be correlated with demand shocks.
Table 5 reports the results of the inverse-demand equations using both OLS
and IV estimation. Columns (1)-(3) present OLS results of inverse-demand
equations, some of which impose the same elasticity while others allow diﬀerent
elasticities for the pre- and post-reform periods. Columns (4)-(6) present equiv-
alent 2SLS results. 19 Column (1), which presents OLS results when imposing
the same elasticity before and after the reforms, suggests a large elasticity of
11.05 for the entire period of study. The results in Column (2) which allow for
diﬀerent elasticities before and after the reforms suggest demand elasticities of
11.66 and 10.94 during the pre- and post-reform periods, respectively.20 By
contrast, the results in Column (3), which allow for diﬀerent intercepts and dif-
ferent elasticities after the reforms, show elasticities of 22.37 and 7.37 during
18There are other important components of proﬁtability that we do not measure, such as
access to credit markets.
19T h es a m p l es i z ei sl a r g e ri nt h i st a b l et h a ni nT a b l e3b e c a u s et h ee s t i m a t i o n si nT a b l e
3 require information on the instruments used for estimating the production function, while
demand estimations only require information on output prices, physical output, and TFP
estimates.
20The pre-reform elasticity is calculted as the inverse of the estimated physical output coef-
ﬁcient. And, the post-reform elasticity is calculted as the inverse of the sum of the estimated
physical output coeﬃcient and the estimated coeﬃcient of physical output interacted with the
post-reform dummy.
15the pre- and post-reform periods, but higher demand after the reforms. As
indicated, however, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting these as elas-
ticities since these coeﬃcients capture the fact that higher demand implies a
positive correlation between output and prices.
The 2SLS results, which use TFP as an instrument for output, indeed show
much lower elasticities.21 The results in Column (4) show a demand elasticity
of 2.28, while the results in Column (5) show a demand elasticity of 2.24 during
the pre-reform period and of 2.3 during the post-reform period. By contrast,
allowing for diﬀerent intercepts and elasticities before and after the reforms
suggests elasticities of 3.17 before the reforms and of 1.88 after the reforms, but
higher demand after the reforms at given price levels.22 The last three columns
in Table 5 report high total and partial R2’s.23 The partial R2’s for physical
output and physical output interacted with the post-reform dummy on TFP, a
post-reform dummy, and TFP interacted with the post-reform dummy are of
0.427 and 0.4621, indicating relevance of the instruments. These results suggest
quantities responded less to changes in prices but overall demand was higher
after the reforms. Increased demand after reforms may be explained by scale
eﬀects generated by trade liberalization measures and by the downward shift in
average production costs induced by factor market reforms.
5 TFP, Demand, and Prices Before and After
the Reforms
In this section we rely on the TFP and demand shock measures estimated in
the last two sections as well as on output prices to document diﬀerences in
the productivity and demand components of proﬁtability in Colombia during
the 1980’s and 1990’s in terms of heterogeneity and persistence. We are, for
21The negative R-squares for the 2SLS are not surprising and should not be viewed as
alarming. Output and the demand shocks are highly positively correlated (this is the entire
reason for using 2SLS rather than OLS). Using the simple inverse-demand equation, the
variance of prices will be equal to terms involving the variance of output, the variance of
demand shocks and a term that depends negatively on the covariance of output and demand
shocks (given that the demand elasticity is negative). Thus, the variance of demand shocks
will exceed the variance of prices and, hence, the negative R-squares.
22Robustness analysis suggests that while it is important to use a TFP measure as an
instrument in the demand equations for output (i.e., elasticities are quite diﬀerent between
OLS and 2SLS in demand equation), it matters much less whether the TFP used is from
OLS or 2SLS estimation of production equation. This reduces concerns about sensitivity of
results to instrument selection for production equations. In addition, we considered energy
and materials prices as instruments for physical output in the inverse-demand equations and
we ﬁnd that the results are very similar whether we use TFP alone or TFP and energy and
m a t e r i a l sp r i c e sa si n s t r u m e n t s .
23The total R2 simply reports the square of the sample correlation coeﬃcient between Yjt
and b Yjt,w h e r eb Yjt is the predicted value of output from a regression of Yjt on the instruments.
The partial R2 reports the square of the sample correlation coeﬃcient between ujt and b ujt,
where ujt are the residuals from an OLS regressions of Yjt on Yjt × Post− reform and b ujt
are the residuals from an OLS regression of the predicted value of Yjt on the predicted value
of the other regressors of the demand equation.
16example, interested in documenting whether productivity is as heterogeneous
and persistent in Colombia as it is in other countries.
Before turning to these issues, however, we report in Table 6 basic descrip-
tive statistics of TFP, demand shocks and output prices for the periods before
and after the reforms. The table shows an increase in the simple means of
total factor productivity and our demand shock measure, but a decrease in the
mean of output prices. Caution needs to be used in interpreting these simple
averages. For TFP, as we emphasize later aggregate TFP can be decomposed
into a term based upon the simple (unweighted) average and a covariance term
reﬂecting the relationship between market share and TFP. The latter can be
i n t e r p r e t e da sa ni n d e xo ft h ee ﬃciency of the allocation of resources and as we
show later is very important in Colombia. With respect to relative prices and
demand shocks, note that the average price is the average price of plant output
relative to the PPI. The average demand shock is the average of the demand
shocks constructed from a micro model of relative prices across plants. On
the other hand, the table shows a substantial increase in the dispersion of TFP,
demand shocks, and output prices. The standard deviations of TFP, demand
shocks and prices increased from 0.68 to 0.91, from 0.78 to 0.88, and from 0.44
to 0.74, respectively. In addition, as expected, Table 6 shows a negative corre-
lation between prices and TFP and output, and a positive correlation between
demand shocks and prices both before and after the reforms, though the corre-
lations are stronger after the reforms. By contrast, TFP and demand shocks
are positively correlated during the pre-reform period but negatively correlated
after the reforms. This correlation points to the eﬀects of trade reform: after
trade liberalization, producers in sectors most exposed to import competition
will simultaneously increase productivity and lose demand. In contrast, man-
ufacturers in sectors least exposed to import competition will have relatively
less incentives for productivity enhancement and will less likely face a drop in
demand. In addition, the table shows that ﬁrms facing higher demand and
productivity shocks produce more output, both before and after reforms. How-
ever, while the relation between output and productivity becomes stronger after
the reforms, the relation between output and demand becomes weaker. This
correlation suggests, again, that the reforms were successful in strengthening
the link between a business’s performance and its productivity. Moreover, this
table shows that not only do more productive ﬁrms increase production after
the reforms, but they also increase their share in the market. This points to the
increased importance of productivity-enhancing reallocation after the reforms,
w h i c hw ed o c u m e n ti nS e c t i o n6 .
5.1 Heterogeneity
Previous evidence for the US suggests a pattern of evolving common produc-
tivity and prices among heterogeneous plants (Baily, Hulten and Campbell
(1992); Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002); Foster, Haltiwanger and Syver-
son (2003); Supina and Roberts (1996)). Like in the U.S., dispersion measures
in Table 6 suggest much heterogeneity in productivity and prices across Colom-
17bian plants. Figures 1-3 show the evolution of dispersion measures of TFP,
demand shocks and output prices over the entire period of study. 24 The ﬁg-
ures show large percentage increases in the dispersion of productivity and prices
over the last two decades. In particular, ﬁgures 1 and 3 shows large rises in the
dispersion of productivity and prices of entering and exiting plants after 1990,
and a constant increase in the dispersion of productivity and output prices of
continuing plants throughout the entire period. By contrast, Figure 2 shows a
much smaller percentage increase in the dispersion of demand over the last two
decades. The greater heterogeneity in productivity is consistent with greater
process experimentation across businesses after reforms, while the modest in-
crease in the dispersion of demand is consistent increased competition, and also
with modest increased experimentation in product variety across businesses.
Figures 4-6 show Kernel distributions of TFP, demand shocks and output
prices for the pre- and post-reforms periods, which illustrate changes in higher
moments of the distributions. The distributions display fatter tails (i.e., in-
creased kurtosis) of the distributions of TFP, demand shocks and output prices
after the reforms, suggesting that more ﬁrms were experiencing either positive
or negative large shocks after the reforms.
5.2 Persistence
To examine whether Colombian plants, like U.S. plants, are characterized by a
large degree of persistence, we estimate AR(1) models for productivity, demand
shocks and prices. Columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 7 report the coeﬃcients on
the lags of productivity, demand and output prices for AR(1) models with year
eﬀects. Our estimates show a great deal of persistence of productivity, demand
shocks and prices in Colombia , much greater than that found for the U.S. The
results suggest that 67% of all plants continue with their initial productivity
after 5 years, 93% of plants face the same demand shocks after 5 years, and
96% charge the same prices as 5 years ago. Studies for the U.S. ﬁnd much
lower degrees of persistence. For example, Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998)
ﬁnd that after 5 years only about a third of all plants remain in the same
productivity quintile. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003) also ﬁnd that
about a third of plants remain in their original position in the productivity and
price distributions after 5 years. In spite of the reforms increased competition
after the reforms, the greater persistence in the Colombian context probably
reﬂects continued presence of distortions in this economy.
Columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 7 also report how the degree of per-
sistence changes after the market reforms. The results suggest persistence in
productivity and output prices increased after the reforms, while the persistence
of demand shocks did not change. At ﬁrst glance, this pattern might be surpris-
ing as one might conjecture that market reforms would lead to greater mobility
in the distributions of eﬃciency, demand shocks, and prices. However, it is
24We have examined these patterns using alternative robust measures of dispersion (in
particular, the 90-10 diﬀerential) and have found very similar patterns overall for TFP, prices
a n dd e m a n ds h o c k s .
18important to emphasize that these persistence measures are conditional on sur-
vival. Our results are consistent with increased weeding out of less productive
plants, as reported in the next section, but lower mobility of the plants that do
s u r v i v ea f t e rt h er e f o r m s .
6 Productivity- and Proﬁtability-Enhancing Re-
allocation
In this section, we examine whether the market reforms changed the alloca-
tion of activity in terms of productivity and demand factors. In particular,
we are interested in whether increased competition as a result of the reform
process induced reallocation from less to more productive plants and reduced
the role of demand factors in the allocation of activity. Similarly, we are in-
terested in whether increased competition as a result of the reforms increased
productivity by making it more diﬃcult for less productive plants to enter the
market and survive. Diﬀerent types of models have been proposed which can
explain productivity-enhancing reallocation of this sort. In learning models
(e.g., Jovanovic (1982), and Ericson and Pakes (1989)), experimentation gener-
ates diﬀerences in productivity and successful experimenters gain market share
over unsuccessful ones. Similarly, vintage capital models can explain gains
in market share of plants with newer vintages over those with older vintages.
If more eﬃcient plants can aﬀord more frequent retooling, initial productivity
diﬀerences would be exacerbated. Moreover, if trade liberalization and FDI
increased competition in product markets after the reform process, this may
have speeded up learning and productivity-enhancing reallocation. Similarly, if
ﬁnancial liberalization in 1992 improved access to credit markets, this may have
provided access to better capital vintages and increased productivity-enhancing
reallocation after the reforms.
6.1 Productivity Growth and Reallocation
We use a cross-sectional decomposition methodology, ﬁrst introduced by Olley
and Pakes (1996), to examine whether the allocation of activity in the economy
has become more or less productivity-enhancing over our period of study. We
conduct the following decomposition of aggregate TFP and total demand shocks,
constructed from our estimates of plant-level TFP and demand:
TFP t = TFPt +
J X
j=1
¡
fjt − ft
¢¡
TFPjt − TFPt
¢
,
dt = dt +
J X
j=1
¡
fjt − ft
¢¡
djt − dt
¢
,
19where TFPt and dt are aggregate total factor productivity and demand shock
measures for a given 3-digit manufacturing sector in year t. These aggregate
measures correspond to weighted averages of our plant-level measures TFP and
demand shocks, where the weights are market shares (calculated as described
below). TFPt and dt are the cross-sectional (unweighted) means of total factor
productivity and demand shock measures across all plants in that sector in
year t, TFP jt and djt are total factor productivity and demand shock measures
of plant j at time t estimated as described in Section 4, fjt is the share or
fraction of plant j0s output out of sectoral output at the 3-digit level in year t,
and ft is the cross-sectional unweighted mean of fjt.25 The second term in this
decomposition allows us to understand whether production is disproportionately
located at high-productivity or high-demand plants. Moreover, by examining
this decomposition over time we can learn whether the cross-sectional allocation
of activity has changed in response to the market reforms.26
Table 8 shows the cross-sectional decompositions for TFP and demand shock
measures from 1982 to 1998. We report the results for the average 3-digit sector.
Column (1) shows a positive trend in aggregate total factor productivity over
the period of study. Columns (2) and (3) show the decomposition of aggregate
productivity into the simple average and the cross-sectional correlation between
market share and total factor productivity. In all years, aggregate productivity
is largely accounted for by the allocation of activity to higher productivity
businesses, as shown by the large fraction that the cross-term represents out
of aggregate productivity. This stands in sharp contrast to results of similar
exercises for the U.S., where the contribution of this term is only marginal (see
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001)). In a context in which the production
possibilities frontier is not improving sharply over time, the allocation of activity
seems to be the crucial factor accounting for the level of aggregate productivity.
The cross-sectional correlation between market share and total factor pro-
ductivity remained roughly constant over the 1980’s, with a slight decrease
by the middle of the decade. By contrast, it increased sharply during the
1990’s, most specially after 1993, once most reforms were fully implemented.
This time-series pattern can be seen in Figure 7 and suggests that market share
increasingly shifted towards more productive plants and away from less produc-
tive plants during the 1990’s. In fact, while average productivity explains about
25This means that our focus here is on within sector allocation and reallocation rather
than between sector allocation, for sectors deﬁned at the 3-digit level. For measurement and
conceptual reasons, comparisons of TFP and relative demand across sectors (in levels) are
more problematic to interpret. Focusing on within sector allocation permits us to emphasize
the degree to which market reforms have led to an improved allocation of activity across
businesses due to higher competition. Nevertheless, we have also tried a decomposition using
the shares or fraction of plant output out of total output. The results based on this alternative
decomposition are similar to those reported below.
26An advantge of this cross-sectional method over methods that decompose changes in
productivity over time, is that cross-sectional diﬀerences in productivity are more persistent
and less dominated by measurement error or transitory shocks. Another advantage is that
this method does not rely on accurate measurement of entry and exit. The downside being,
of course, that this decomposition does not allow charactererizing the role of entry and exit.
We explore the latter in Section 6.2.
208.6% of aggregate productivity during the pre-reform period, it only explains
about 5.5% of aggregate productivity during the post-reform period.
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 9 provide evidence of the statistical signiﬁcance of
the eﬀects of reforms on the Olley-Pakes decomposition of TFP, just described.
Each of these columns reports results of regressing one of the terms of the TFP
decomposition on a post-reform dummy that takes a value of 1 in 1991-1998, and
ISIC 3-digit sector controls, using data at the 3-digit level. Column (1) shows
results using aggregate TFP (the weighted average of TFP using market shares
as weights) as dependent variable. The results show a statistically signiﬁcant
increase in aggregate TFP after the reforms. Column (2) reports results of
ar e g r e s s i o no ft h es i m p l ea v e r a g eo fT F P . T h e s er e s u l t ss h o wn os i g n i ﬁcant
change in the unweighted mean of TFP. Finally, column (3) reports results of a
regression of the cross-sectional correlation between market share and TFP. The
results show a signiﬁcant increase of almost 50% (with respect to the magnitudes
reported in Table 8) in the correlation between market share and TFP after the
reforms. Thus, the post-reform period is characterized by a signiﬁcant increase
in the ability of highly productive ﬁrms to gain market share.27
The last three columns of Table 8 show the Olley-Pakes decomposition of
our demand shock measure, since we are also interested in whether the reform
process changed the role of demand factors in the allocation of activity. Column
(4) shows a decreasing trend of aggregate demand shocks over the period of
study, although the average plant actually perceived an increase in demand
(column (5)). Moreover, in contrast to the results on productivity, Column (6)
suggests that the concentration of activity in high demand plants became less
important during the 1990’s. Figure 8 shows the time-series pattern of this
decomposition.
The statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀects of reforms on the decomposition of
demand shocks is analyzed in columns (4)-(6) of Table 9. As was the case for the
d e c o m p o s i t i o no fT F P ,e a c ho ft h e s ec o l u m n sp r e s e n t st h er e s u l t so far e g r e s s i o n
of one of the components of the decomposition of demand on the post-reform
dummy and sector controls, using data at the 3-digit sector level. The dependent
variable in column (4) is the aggregate demand shock, in column (5) it is the
simple average of plant-level demand shocks, and in column (6) it is the cross
term of the decomposition. The results indicate a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant change in aggregate demand shocks after the reforms (column (4)),
although the magnitude of the change is small relative to the magnitudes of
aggregate demand shocks, as reported in Table 8. Nevertheless, the demand
shocks faced by the average plant experience a positive and signiﬁcant change
with the reforms. The decline in aggregate demand shocks is explained by a
decrease in the correlation between demand shocks and market share, which fell
signiﬁcantly after the reforms. These eﬀects point to a decline in the relative
importance of high demand in gaining market share.
27As reform does not signiﬁcantly change the simple average of TFP, rather than plant
turnover what explains the changes in aggregate TFP is the reallocation from less productive
to more productive incumbents. Indeed, below we document that on net the contribution of
entry and exit to productivity rises only slightly post reform.
21Our results suggest that the packet of reforms, most likely through its com-
ponents of trade liberalization, removal of FDI restrictions and liberalization of
factor markets, contributed to raise productivity by improving the allocation of
activity with higher market shares at high-productivity plants and lower mar-
ket shares at low-productivity plants. At the same time, we ﬁnd that, after
the reforms, the allocation of activity was driven less by high demand plants
commanding larger shares. This latter ﬁnding is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that increased competition reduced the inﬂuence of demand factors (i.e.,
markets became more competitive) in the allocation of activity.
6.2 Entry and Exit Eﬀects
Vintage capital models of industry dynamics suggest new ﬁrms are relatively
more productive, as they receive the productivity associated with the latest
vintage technology, and once they have entered the market their productivity
remains constant over time unless hit by random shocks. Then, ﬁrms exit
the market when the productivity relative to new entrants is below a certain
threshold. However, aside from Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003) who
ﬁnd higher productivity of entering plants and lower productivity of exiting
plants, the previous literature documents lower productivity of both entering
and exiting relative to incumbent plants (see Bartelsman and Doms (2000)), a
ﬁnding that is at odds with the vintage capital model. Uing our estimates of
TFP and demand shocks, we analyze this issue for the Colombian economy, and
explore whether the market-oriented reforms changed how productive entering
and exiting businesses are relative to incumbents.
Table 10 reports regressions of TFP, demand shocks, and prices on year
dummies as well as on entry and exit dummies. The entry dummy takes a
value of 1 for plant j in period t if the plant produced in year t but not in t−1
. Conversely, the exit dummy takes a value of 1 for plant j in period t if plant
j produced in period t but not in t + 1. Column (1) in Table 10 shows that ,
consistent with the vintage capital hypothesis, productivity of entering plants is
above and productivity of exiting plants below that of the average incumbent.
Our results coincide with those in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2003).
Like theirs, our TFP estimation uses physical output rather than revenue, which
avoids confounding price and productivity variations in measures of TFP. The
results in Column (5) also show lower idiosyncratic demand for entering and
exiting plants relative to the average incumbent, and the results in Column
(9) show entrants and exiting plants charging higher prices than incumbents.
While higher prices at exiting plants are consistent with their lower productivity,
higher prices at entering plants might reﬂect their smaller scale or perhaps higher
markups.
Since the reforms introduced during the 1990’s are generally expected to
increase competition, we also explore whether the productivity, demand and
prices of entering and exiting plants relative to incumbents changed after the
implementation of these reforms by interacting the entry and exit dummies with
a post-reform dummy which takes the value of 1 for the period 1990-1998. The
22results in Column (2) of Table 10 show a much smaller diﬀerential entry eﬀect
on productivity after the reforms. That is, after the reforms, entering busi-
nesses had a smaller productivity advantage relative to incumbents in the year
of entry. Lower adjustment costs due to less distorted factor markets appear
to show a greater ability of surviving incumbents to catch-up with potentially
highly productive entrants. First, they can retool more frequently to install
latest vintage technologies. Second, this is consistent with increased layoﬀso f
unproductive workers after the reduction in dismissal costs in 1990. Alterna-
tively, there may have been increased market experimentation after the reforms
so that the average entrant had lower initial productivity. This latter idea we
explore further below.
On the other hand, the results suggest that productivity of exiting plants
relative to incumbents fell substantially after the reforms. This pattern is
consistent with increased exit of plants which may had been kept aﬂoat by
subsidized credit, relatively low taxes, and lack of international competition
before 1990. On net, the contribution of entry and exit to overall productivity
rises slightly after the reforms. Moreover, the results show that relative demand
for entering and exiting plants did not change after the reforms. On the other
hand, relative prices of both entering and exiting plants increased after the
reforms.
We also examine learning eﬀects by looking at the evolution of productivity,
demand, and prices of plants over the ﬁrst years they are in the market. The
results in Column (3) of Table 10 , for the entire period, include one- and two-
period lags of the entry dummies and one- and two-period leads of exit dummies,
capturing plants that entered in t−1a n dt−2 and plants that will exit in t+1
and t+2. The results show little evidence of learning prior to market reforms, as
businesses do not appear to be more productive one or two years after entering
than they were upon entrance. However, after market reforms there is evidence
of substantial learning amongst entrants. As noted, the productivity advantage
of entrants diminished after reforms but the productivity advantage two years
after entry increased after the reform. This pattern is consistent with the
hypothesis mentioned above of increased market experimentation by entrants
after the reforms.
We also examine a number of other patterns in terms of entry and exit. It
is interesting to note that there is evidence of a “shadow of death” eﬀect: the
negative productivity diﬀerential faced by exiting plants becomes stronger the
closer to exiting the plant is. This eﬀect grows stronger after reforms. We
also ﬁnd some evidence of ”learning” in terms of demand and prices. In this
context, we mean that entering plants appear to gain a greater demand/price
advantage as time after entry grows. Column (7) and (11) show that , as time
elapses since plant entry, the plant’s relative demand grows and the prices it
charges for the output fall. Columns (8) and (12) show greater learning eﬀects
in demand and prices after the reforms.
In short, the results suggest that market reforms yielded a more heterogenous
group of entrants, but that conditional on survival the post-reform entrants
contribute more to productivity . Subsidized credit prior to the 1990 and 1991
23ﬁnancial reforms may have previously encouraged entry of unproductive plants
and kept existing unproductive plants aﬂoat. Moreover, greater learning after
reforms may be due to greater access to new vintages of imported capital and
greater access to the know-how of foreign ﬁrms in the economy. In terms of
exiting behavior, intensiﬁed foreign competition after the trade reforms seems to
have increased market discipline by forcing ﬁrms either to increase productivity
and charge lower prices, or else exit the market.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how reallocation contributes to productivity and
other determinants of proﬁtability in Colombia. Then, we ask how the relation
between reallocation and productivity and demand factors changed after market
reforms were introduced in Colombia during the early 1990’s. The extent,
breadth and swiftness of the reforms make Colombia a superb country to study
these issues. In addition, a unique feature of the Colombian data is that it
allows us to measure both plant-level quantities and prices, making these data
ideal for measuring plant-level productivity and demand.
We propose a sequential methodology for estimating both productivity and
demand shocks at the plant level. First, we generate measures of plant-level
total factor productivity by estimating KLEM production functions using plant-
level physical output data. To eliminate biases from the correlation between
productivity shocks and inputs, we use downstream demand shifts and plant-
level energy and materials prices as instruments in estimating production func-
tions. We then generate plant-level demand shocks by estimating inverse-
demand equations using plant-level output prices, where output is instrumented
with TFP to eliminate biases from the correlation between demand shocks and
output.
We ﬁnd some interesting patterns with regards to total factor productiv-
ity, prices and demand shocks in Colombia, which sometimes contrast with the
patterns found for the U.S. First, as in the U.S., we ﬁnd a great deal of het-
erogeneity in terms of productivity and output prices, and we ﬁnd that this
heterogeneity has been increasing over the past decades. Second, we ﬁnd a
large degree of persistence in productivity, prices and demand, which doubles
or triples the degree of persistence found in the U.S.
We also explore turnover dynamics in Colombia during the entire period of
study as well as before and after the introduction of reforms. First, consistent
with recent evidence for the U.S. which uses plant-level prices, we ﬁnd that
entering business are more productive than incumbents and the exiting busi-
nesses they are replacing, and that exiting businesses are much less productive
than incumbents. Note that revenue-based TFP measures spuriously include a
demand component and thus underestimate the technical eﬃciency of entrants,
who have to build a consumer base, relative to incumbents, who have a estab-
lished clientele. For this reason, our analysis provides a better basis to discern
between vintage and learning models. Our results are more consistent with a
24vintage capital explanation than a learning explanation of industry dynamics.
In addition, we ﬁnd that turnover is aﬀected by demand-side factors, as both en-
tering and exiting plants face lower demand for their products than incumbents.
Second, we explore how these patterns changed in response to market reforms.
After the reforms, entering businesses no longer had as much initial productivity
advantage relative to incumbents, but the productivity of exiting plants relative
to incumbents falls substantially. On net, the contribution of entry and exit
rises slightly. This is consistent with increased redundancy of unproductive
workers, who were previously retained by plants due to high dismissal costs,
a n dw i t hi n c r e a s e de x i to fp l a n t sw h i c hm a yh a db e e nk e p ta ﬂoat by subsidized
credit, relatively low taxes, and limited foreign competition before 1990. When
we explore a more dynamic speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd evidence of learning eﬀects
for surviving entrants after the reforms. This is consistent with a contribu-
tion to learning due to trade and foreign direct investment liberalization. The
increased competition also imposed market discipline, forcing plants to either
increase productivity and charge lower prices, or exit the market. On the other
hand, access to new vintages of imported capital also contributes to productiv-
ity growth if lower capital adjustment costs increase the optimal frequency of
retooling to install equipment embedding latest technology.
Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the allocation of activity across businesses
reﬂects both eﬃciency and demand factors. Businesses with higher TFP and
higher demand have a higher market share. The more interesting question is
how these patterns changed in response to market reforms. We ﬁnd that, after
the reforms, there is a signiﬁcant increase in the importance of eﬃciency and a
decline in the importance of demand factors in determining productivity. This
change in the eﬃciency of allocation has a large impact on aggregate produc-
tivity. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the higher aggregate productivity in Colombia
over this period (for the average 3-digit industry) is largely accounted for by the
improved allocation of activity to high-productivity businesses. We also ﬁnd
that demand factors become less important after market reforms in determining
the allocation of activity which is consistent with the implications of increased
product market competition.
Our paper takes a ﬁrst look at the impact of the reforms on the relation be-
tween eﬃciency and demand-side factors and the allocation of activity by essen-
tially asking whether the covariance structure of productivity, demand shocks
and the allocation of activity changes after the reforms. While instructive,
much research remains to be done in this context , in particular to investigate
the reforms with more information and structure. In future work, we plan to
explore the temporal and cross-sectional variation of the various reforms more
fully. Not all the market reforms happened at the exact same time, and many
of the market reforms likely impacted ﬁrms diﬀerentially depending upon sector
and other characteristics (e.g., factor intensities, size, and location) of the busi-
nesses. Moreover, we plan to explore the dynamic implications of the reforms
in terms of their impact on market selection in Colombia.
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29Appendix:
Longitudinal Linkages in the AMS Data
The identiﬁcation of establishments in the AMS for the period 1982-1998
has overcome changes in sampling and labeling of plants. In essence, there are
three groups of plant identiﬁers: a system that allows following plants from
1982 to 1991, 28 another system that can be used to follow plants from 1993
onwards, and ﬁnally a transition system that is supposed to provide the neces-
sary link over the transition period (1991-1993). Nevertheless, the latter set is
quite incomplete, so that many plants that existed prior to 1992 and survived
until after 1993 cannot be successfully identiﬁed as continuers. As a result,
matching plants using the transition identiﬁers leads to spurious calculations
of entry and exit. To solve this problem, we relied on some existing records
of additional identiﬁers that, although incomplete, provide some information
about the diﬀerent identiﬁers a given plant was assigned over the period. This
additional eﬀort eliminated a large fraction of the spurious entry and exit. For
instance, after performing this additional matching, we are unable to follow only
740 plants after 1991, while in previous independent attempts documented by
DANE the corresponding ﬁgure was 4083. However, 740 ”deaths” in a year is
still too high a ﬁgure compared to the historic yearly exit rates. Similarly, we
obtain too high an entry rate for 1992 relative to historic levels, to be fully
explained by fundamentals.
Spuriously high exit and entry rates stem from two sources. First, changes
in the sample resulting from the change of survey unit from establishment to
enterprise. In particular, from 1992 if a ﬁrm that owns various establishment
satisﬁes the requirements to enter the sample, each of its establishments is in-
cluded, independently of whether the plant itself satisﬁes the requirements or
not. 29 Before 1992, meanwhile, only establishments that satisﬁed the require-
ments were included in the sample, independently of their ownership. To
solve the problem of sample change, we deleted from our base of each year the
establishments that do not satisfy the requirements of the sample.30
28This is the time period covered by the subset of AMS data used by Roberts and Tybout
(1996) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998). Note that their sample does not include any
years after the implementation of structural reforms in Colombia, nor does it have plant-level
price indices.
29These requirements are that an establishment must have 10 or more employees or have a
production superior to a given limit. Such limit was 25 million Colombian Pesos (in current
terms) for 1982-1991, 50 million for 1992-1995, 60 million for 1996-1997, and 70.5 million for
1998. One obvious problem of these requirements is that the minimum production has always
b e e ne s t a b l i s h e di nc u r r e n tp e s o s ,a n dh a sn o tb e e np r o p e r l ym o d i ﬁed to reﬂect inﬂation. With
an average PPI inﬂation of around 20% , the minimum real production required for inclusion
in the sample decreased dramatically over those years where the limit was kept constant. This
may be aﬀecting the levels of entry and exit; our measure of entry will actually be an upper
bound of entry, while the opposite will happen with our measure of exit. Notwithstanding
this problem, we decided not to change the requirements to enter the sample because the only
non-arbitrary method we found (deﬂating the limits by some known deﬂator, like PPI) leads
to an underestimation of the growth of the industry. Moreover, the limit on the number of
employees is the binding requirement in most cases.
30One point to note is that, apparently, the change in methodology also included surveying
30Secondly, there are possible mistakes in the assignment of codes, that make
impossible to match an establishment between 1991 and 1992, even though the
establishment continues over the period. The solution to this problem implies
matching what now is a ”death of 1991” with what now appears to be an
“entry of 1992”. This matching must use additional information, such as the
one contained in the directories where data on the name, tax identiﬁcation
number, location, and other characteristics of the plant are recorded. We
therefore resorted to these directories. Due to diﬀerences in the format of
the information, only the data on phone number, sector identiﬁcation code and
municipality were used for this match. Unfortunately, this new attempt yielded
very few matches.
Given the failure of the eﬀorts documented above to fully solve the prob-
lem of spurious entry and exit over the transition period, we implemented a
probabilistic approach to eliminate the remaining problems. Our methodology
involves estimating the probabilities, on the basis of observable characteristics,
of entering and exiting of the plants that, after the previous procedures, appear
as exiting in 1991 or entering in 1992. We used a Probit estimation procedure
to model the probability of entry and the probability of exit in any given year.
We deﬁned the discrete variables ENTER and EXIT for entry and exit, respec-
tively, with the values of 1 for event and 0 for nonevent. In our model, a plant
of a given sector and a given geographic region enters (exits) when its expected
proﬁts are higher (lower) than an exogenously given limit. Proﬁts πjt are a
linear function of (real) output and number of employees. The probability of
entry and exit within a sector and a geographic region is, therefore, a function
of output and employment.
Let s be a subscript for 2 digits sector and r be a subscript for region
(Atlantic, Paciﬁc, Central, and Antioquia plus Viejo Caldas). Then, for plant j
that belongs to sector s and region r,l e tejt = 1 if plant j enters in year t,w i t h
ejt = 0 otherwise, and xjt =1i fp l a n tj exits in year t,w i t hxjt =0o t h e r w i s e .
The entry probability may be expressed as,
Pr(ejt =1 )=P r ( πjt > π∗)=P r ( β0,sr + β1,srYjt + β2,srLjt + ²jt > π∗)
Assuming ²jt follows a cumulative normal distribution denoted by F,
Pr(ejt =1 )=1− F(−X0
jtψ)=F(X0
jtψ)
where the last step follows from the fact that F is a symmetric distribution, and
Xjt =
£
10,Y0
jt,L 0
jt
¤
and ψ
0 =[ β0 − π∗,β1,β2].
establishments that were not in the sample even though they did satisfy the requirements (due
to previous failures in enforcing the requirement to report to the AMS). This modiﬁcation is
not formally documented, but DANE staﬀ have reported that an eﬀort was made in 1992 to
improve the actual coverage of the survey. To the extent that this is the case, the solution
proposed above to the problem of change in sample (namely, to keep only establishments that
satisfy the sample criteria) will not fully alleviate the problem.
31When estimating the model for entry in 1992 (exit in 1991), we used in-
formation by sector and geographic region, where all years and plants where
pooled. For each estimation we excluded the plants for which we wanted to pre-
dict the probability of event (plants that after the previous procedures appear
as entering in 1992 or exiting in 1991). For the data used in the estimations,
the model predicted correctly between 50% and 88% of the observed responses,
depending on the sector-region combination. For most groups the model pre-
dicted correctly about 70% of the responses. With the estimated parameters we
calculated the predicted probabilities of entering in 1992 (exiting in 1991) using
the data for plants that in our database appeared as entries of 92 (exits of 91).
Out of these groups, we kept in our database only the 179 (372) plants that
presented highest predicted probabilities of entering (exiting). The number of
plants we actually kept in the sample corresponds to the average of entries in
1991 and 1993 (exits in 1990 and 1992).
32Figure 1: TFP Dispersion for Continuing, Entering, and Exiting Plants, 
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D. Shock Simple Average Share-D. Shock Cross TermTable 1: Descriptive Statistics for Continuing, Entering, and Exiting Plants,
Before and After Market-Oriented Reforms
Pre-Reforms Post-Reforms
Variable All Continuers Entrants Exits All Continuers Entrants Exits
Output 10.49
(1.67)
10.72
(1.66)
9.47
(1.29)
9.39
(1.36)
10.90
(1.88)
11.12
(1.83)
9.87
(1.64)
9.72
(1.60)
Capital 8.21
(2.05)
8.42
(2.04)
6.93
(1.66)
7.30
(1.81)
8.75
(2.18)
8.91
(2.15)
7.51
(1.91)
7.76
(1.96)
Labor 10.97
(1.1)
11.08
(1.10)
10.21
(0.78)
10.32
(0.83)
10.95
(1.25)
11.13
(1.23)
10.15
(1.07)
10.30
(1.11)
Energy 11.30
(1.88)
11.51
(1.89)
10.16
(1.42)
10.34
(1.55)
11.55
(1.99)
11.76
(1.97)
10.45
(1.71)
10.64
(1.75)
Materials 9.61
(1.85)
9.83
(1.83)
8.58
(1.54)
8.48
(1.57)
10.25
(1.88)
10.45
(1.84)
9.32
(1.66)
8.99
(1.71)
Output
Prices
-0.08
(0.44)
-0.09
(0.46)
-0.07
(0.51)
-0.06
(0.47)
-0.15
(0.74)
-0.15
(0.71)
-0.10
(0.8)
-0.09
(0.81)
Energy
Prices
0.25
(0.50)
0.28
(0.52)
0.32
(0.55)
0.22
(0.49)
0.55
(0.43)
0.55
(0.41)
0.61
(0.49)
0.55
(0.41)
Material
Prices
0.02
(0.35)
0.02
(0.37)
0.05
(0.43)
0.02
(0.38)
-0.10
(0.57)
-0.09
(0.53)
-0.13
(0.71)
-0.01
(0.73)
Entry Rate 0.0981 0.0843
Exit Rate 0.0873 0.1069
N 55,298 41,265 4,846 4,826 44,816 32,395 3,778 4,202
Notes:  This table reports means and standard deviations of the log of quantities and of prices deviated from yearly producer price indices.  The entry and exit
rates are the number of entrants divided by total plants and number of exiting firms divided by total number of plants.  The pre-reform period includes the years
1982-90 and the post-reform period includes the years 1991-98.Table 2: Correlations of Variables
Output Capital Labor Energy Materials Output
Prices
Energy
Price
Materials
Prices
Output 1.0
[100,114]
0.7550
[96,232]
0.7393
[99,102]
0.7649
[99,476]
0.8982
[90,938]
-0.2918
[100,114]
-0.0591
[100,095]
-0.0705
[91,540]
Capital 1.0
[96,232]
0.6904
[95,303]
0.7592
[95,684]
0.7267
[87,519]
-0.0092
[96,232]
-0.0082
[96,213]
-0.0241
[88,066]
Labor 1.0
[99,102]
0.6963
[98,484]
0.6761
[90,073]
0.0084
[99,102]
-0.0389
[99,083]
0.0067
[90,671]
Energy 1.0
[99,476]
0.7492
[90,394]
0.0087
[99,476]
-0.1198
[99,457]
-0.0188
[90,944]
Materials 1.0
[90,938]
-0.0063
[90,938]
0.0207
[90,929]
-0.2384
[90,938]
Output
Prices
1.0
[100,114]
-0.0047
[100,095]
0.2469
[91,540]
Energy
Prices
1.0
[100,095]
-0.0118
[91,531]
Materials
Prices
1.0
[91,540]
Notes:  The table includes bivariate correlations of logs of quantities and price deviations from yearly producer price indices.  The
numbers in square brackets are the number of observations.Table 3: Production Function Equations
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital 0.3226
(0.004)
0.0764
(0.0025)
0.4646
(0.0165)
0.3027
(0.0225)
Labor 0.7411
(0.0071)
1.0398
(0.0596)
Labor Hours 0.2393
(0.0037)
0.2125
(0.0313)
Energy 0.124
(0.0028)
0.1757
(0.0143)
Materials 0.5891
(0.0026)
0.2752
(0.0095)
R² 0.5806 0.8621 0.4787 0.8107
N 42,235 48,114 42,235 48,114
Notes:  The standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The regressions in Columns (1) and (3) use the log of
value added as the dependent variable, where value added is revenue minus materials and energy costs, and
capital and employment as the regressors.  The regressions in Columns (2) and (4) use the log of physical output
as the dependent variable, and capital, employment hours, energy, and materials as regressors.  All regressors
are in logs.  The two-stage least squares regressions use the following variables to instrument the inputs:  Shea’s
(1993) downstream demand instruments constructed as the demand for the intermediate output (calculated using
the input-output matrix); one- and two-period lags of downstream demand; regional government expenditures,
excluding government investment; and energy and material plant-level prices, deviated from the yearly PPI.Table 4: First-Stage Regressions of Inputs for Production Function Equations
Capital Labor Energy Materials
Instrumental Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Downstream Demand-shift 0.0157
(0.0362)
-0.1059
(0.0207)
0.2005
(0.032)
0.2506
(0.0317)
One-period Lag of
Downstream Demand-shift
-0.1368
(0.0499)
-0.0483
(0.0286)
-0.1456
(0.0441)
-0.1619
(0.0437)
Two-period lag of
Downstream Demand-shift
0.3752
(0.0318)
0.0558
(0.0182)
0.3142
(0.0281)
0.3005
(0.0278)
Regional Current Governmen
Expenditure
0.0484
(0.0069)
0.085
(0.004)
-0.0633
(0.0061)
-0.0166
(0.0061)
Plant-level Energy Price -0.2415
(0.0199)
-0.1257
(0.0114)
-0.5676
(0.0176)
-0.166
(0.0175)
Plant-level Materials
Price
-0.0253
(0.0188)
0.0386
(0.0108)
0.0166
(0.0166)
-0.8157
(0.0164)
R² 0.0319 0.0127 0.064 0.1129
Physical Output Partial R² 0.1276 0.139 0.231 0.324
Value-added Partial R² 0.2563 0.1324 - -
N 48,114 48,114 48,114 48,114
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  The variables are in logs.  The price variables are deviations from the yearly PPI.
Following Shea (1993), downstream demand-shift instruments are total output measures in downstream industries that meet the
following two conditions: (1) their demand share for upstream production has to exceed 15%, and (2) the share of the upstream
industry in their total costs does not exceed 15%. The R² simply reports the square of the sample correlation coefficient between
Ijt and Îjt, where I=K,L,E,M and Îjt are the predicted values of the inputs from a regression of Ijt on the instruments.  The partial R²
reports the sample correlation coefficient between sjt and ŝjt, where sjt are the residuals from a regression of Ijt on all other inputs
I1jt and ŝjt are the correlations between Îjt and the predicted values of all other inputs Î1jt.Table 5: Inverse Demand Equations
OLS 2SLS First Stages
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) R²
Partial  R²
Regression
(5)
Partial R²
 Regression
(6)
Physical
Output
-0.0905
(0.0011)
-0.0858
(0.0011)
-0.0447
(0.0015)
-0.4381
(0.0034)
-0.4456
(0.0035)
-0.3158
(0.0051)
0.2177 0.4696 0.427
Post-reforms 0.9433
(0.0232)
2.4203
(0.0730)
-- -
Physical Output ×
Post-reforms
-0.0056
(0.0003)
-0.0909
(0.0021)
0.0104
(0.0005)
-0.2152
(0.0067)
0.9585 0.9599 0.4621
R² 0.0766 0.0793 0.0966 -1.0540 -1.0643 -0.9578 - - -
N 86,251 86,251 86,251 86,251 86,251 86,251 86,251 86,251 86,251
Notes:  Standard Errors are in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the plant-level price minus the yearly PPI (all in logs).  Two-stage least
squares regressions instrument physical output and the interaction of physical output with the TFP measure estimated using Column (4) of
Table 3 and with the post-reform dummy and the TFP measure interacted with the post-reform dummy.  The post-reform dummy takes the
value of 1 for the period 1991-98 and 0 otherwise.  The R² simply reports the square of the sample correlation coefficient between Yjt and Ŷjt,
where Ŷjt is the predicted value of output from a regression of Yjt on the instruments.  The partial R² reports the sample correlation
coefficient between ujt and ûjt, where ujt are the residuals from a regression of Yjt and Yjt × Postt and ûjt are the correlations between Ŷjt and
with the predicted value Ŷjt × Postt, when only shift changes are considered, and with the interaction between the predicted value of output,
Ŷjt, and the predicted value of the post-reform dummy.Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of TFP, Demand Shocks and Prices,
Before and After the Reforms
Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Total Factor Productivity
(TFP)
0.0125
(0.6817)
ρTFP,D     = 0.1114
  ρTFP,P      = -0.5205
ρTFP,output = 0.427
ρTFP,share = 0.1297
0.046
(0.909)
   ρTFP,D       = -0.0995
   ρTFP,P         =  -0.6934
ρTFP,output  =  0.506
ρTFP,share  = 0.1836
Demand Shock (D) -0.0723
(0.7826)
  ρD,P       = 0.391
ρD,output = 0.8337
ρD,share = 0.3778
0.0324
(0.8836)
ρD,P = 0.4995
ρD,output = 0.6243
ρD,share = 0.2863
Output Price (P) -0.0764
(0.4395)
ρP,output = -0.1822
-0.1509
(0.7414)
ρP,output = -0.365
Notes:  The table reports means, standard deviations in parentheses, and bivariate correlations.  The physical output
measure of TFP is estimated as the residual of the production function in Column (4) of Table 3.  The demand shock
is estimated as the residual of the inverse demand equation in Column (4) of Table 5.  Output prices are plant-level
prices relative to yearly PPI. Shares are estimated as the fraction of plant output in total output.Table 7: Persistence of TFP, Demand Shocks, and Output Prices
TFP Demand Shocks Output Prices
Regressor (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6)
One-period Lag of
Dependent Variable
0.9221
(0.0018)
0.896
(0.0029)
0.9853
(0.0009)
0.9871
(0.0014)
0.9925
(0.0013)
0.982
(0.0026)
One-period Lag of Dependent
Variable × Post Reforms
0.043
(0.0037)
-0.0033
(0.0019)
0.0144
(0.003)
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R² 0.782 0.7824 0.9305 0.9305 0.868 0.868
N 73,063 73,063 85,576 85,576 85,576 85,576
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports coefficients on lagged TFP, lagged demand shocks, and lagged output
prices in the first and second, third and fourth, and fifth and sixth columns, respectively.  All regressions include year effects.  The
TFP variable is estimated as the residual from the regression in Column (4) of Table 3 and the demand shock variable is estimated as
the residual from the regression in Column (4) of Table 5.  Output prices are plant-level prices relative to yearly PPI.Table 8: Cross-Section Decomposition of Three-Digit Level TFP and Demand Shocks, 1982-1998
TFP Demand Shocks
Year Aggregate
(Weighted)
Simple
Average
Cross-term Aggregate
(Weighted)
Simple
Average
Cross-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1982 0.28
(100)
-0.05
(-16.46)
0.33
(116.46)
1.26
(100)
0.04
(3.30)
1.22
(96.70)
1983 0.29
(100)
-0.09
(-30.80)
0.38
(130.80)
1.22
(100)
0.03
(2.12)
1.20
(97.88)
1984 0.26
(100)
-0.07
(-28.57)
0.33
(128.57)
1.27
(100)
0.08
(6.31)
1.19
(93.69)
1985 0.33
(100)
0.00
(-0.28)
0.33
(100.28)
1.27
(100)
0.07
(5.73)
1.20
(94.27)
1986 0.33
(100)
0.06
(16.49)
0.28
(83.51)
1.27
(100)
0.07
(5.76)
1.19
(94.24)
1987 0.36
(100)
0.07
(18.99)
0.29
(81.01)
1.30
(100)
0.09
(6.73)
1.22
(93.27)
1988 0.42
(100)
0.14
(32.21)
0.29
(67.79)
1.32
(100)
0.12
(8.86)
1.20
(91.14)
1989 0.40
(100)
0.11
(28.71)
0.29
(71.29)
1.28
(100)
0.08
(6.23)
1.20
(93.77)
1990 0.45
(100)
0.10
(22.82)
0.35
(77.18)
1.28
(100)
0.10
(7.63)
1.18
(92.37)
1991 0.48
(100)
0.12
(24.40)
0.36
(75.60)
1.24
(100)
0.07
(6.04)
1.16
(93.96)
1992 0.46
(100)
0.05
(10.59)
0.41
(89.41)
1.26
(100)
0.17
(13.62)
1.09
(86.38)
1993 0.43
(100)
0.05
(11.99)
0.38
(88.01)
1.28
(100)
0.23
(17.74)
1.06
(82.26)
1994 0.47
(100)
0.03
(6.55)
0.44
(93.45)
1.28
(100)
0.24
(18.35)
1.05
(81.65)
1995 0.46
(100)
-0.04
(-8.44)
0.50
(108.44)
1.28
(100)
0.21
(16.74)
1.07
(83.26)
1996 0.53
(100)
-0.05
(-8.77)
0.58
(108.77)
1.21
(100)
0.17
(14.15)
1.04
(85.85)
1997 0.54
(100)
0.01
(2.71)
0.53
(97.29)
1.21
(100)
0.16
(13.31)
1.05
(86.69)
1998 0.58
(100)
0.04
(6.95)
0.54
(93.05)
1.13
(100)
0.11
(9.52)
1.03
(90.48)
Pre-reforms 0.35
(100)
0.03
(8.56)
0.32
(91.44)
1.27
(100)
0.08
(5.88)
1.20
(94.12)
Post-reforms 0.50
(100)
0.03
(5.50)
0.47
(94.50)
1.24
(100)
0.17
(13.78)
1.07
(86.22)
Notes:  All figures are simple means of 3-digit sector level statistics.  Columns (1) and (4) show the weighted mean of TFP and the demand shocks respectively,
where market shares are the weights.  The market shares are measured as the share or fraction of output contributed by each plant to sectoral output defined at the
3-digit level. Columns (2) and (5) show the contribution to those weighted means of the simple means of TFP and the demand shock, respectively.  Columns (3)
and (6) show the contribution of the cross-sectional correlation between market share and TFP and demand shocks, respectively.  The numbers in parentheses are
the fractions represented by each component.Table 9: Decomposition of Conditional Means of TFP and Demand Shocks,
Before and After Reforms
TFP Demand Shocks
Regressor Aggregate
(Weighted)
Simple
Average
Cross-
term
Aggregate
(Weighted)
Simple
Average
Cross-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-reform
dummy
0.1472
(0.0231)
-0.0026
(0.0171)
0.1498
(0.0185)
-0.0362
(0.0152)
0.0957
(0.0140)
-0.1319
(0.0131)
Sector effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R
2 0.7022 0.6552 0.5939 0.926 0.9078 0.8456
N 493 493 493 493 493 493
With
sector
effects
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The table reports coefficients of a regression of one term of TFP or demand
decomposition on a constant and a post-reform dummy. The regression is at 3-digit level. The post-reform dummy takes the
value of 1 in 1991-1998, 0 otherwise. In columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is the weighted mean of TFP and the
demand shocks respectively, where market shares are the weights.  In columns (2) and (5) the dependent variable is the
simple mean of TFP and demand shocks, respectively. In columns (3) and (6) the dependent variable is the cross-sectional
correlation between market share and TFP and demand shocks, respectively.Table 10: Evolution of TFP, Demand Shocks, and Output Prices
TFP Demand Shocks Output Prices
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Entry 0.0288
(0.0115)
0.0592
(0.0148)
0.0847
(0.014)
0.121
(0.0178)
-0.4354
(0.0094)
-0.4441
(0.0123)
-0.4681
(0.0111)
-0.4808
(0.0143)
0.0257
(0.007)
0.0119
(0.0091)
0.0386
(0.0084)
0.0319
(0.0108)
Entry ×
Post-ref.
-0.0771
(0.0235)
-0.0968
(0.0288)
0.021
(0.0191)
0.0341
(0.0228)
0.0339
(0.0141)
0.0192
(0.0173)
1-prd. Lag
of Entry
0.0938
(0.0133)
0.0986
(0.0157)
-0.3941
(0.0123)
-0.4002
(0.0147)
0.0242
(0.0093)
0.0265
(0.0111)
1-prd. Lag
of Entry ×
Post-ref.
-0.0201
(0.0296)
0.0212
(0.0269)
-0.0058
(0.0204)
2-prd. Lag
of Entry
0.0644
(0.014)
0.047
(0.0165)
-0.3484
(0.013)
-0.3696
(0.0155)
0.0138
(0.0099)
0.008
(0.0118)
2-prd. Lag
of Entry ×
Post-ref.
0.0617
(0.031)
0.0731
(0.0284)
0.0217
(0.0216)
Exit -0.2497
(0.0102)
-0.2262
(0.0141)
-0.2666
(0.0122)
-0.2408
(0.0172)
-0.4664
(0.0094)
-0.4589
(0.0132)
-0.4829
(0.011)
-0.4885
(0.0156)
0.0306
(0.0069)
0.0087
(0.0098)
0.0319
(0.0083)
0.0018
(0.0118)
Exit × Post-
reforms
-0.0485
(0.0204)
-0.0519
(0.0244)
-0.0152
(0.0188)
0.0117
(0.022)
0.0438
(0.0139)
0.0608
(0.0167)
1-prd. Lead
of Exit
-0.1826
(0.0131)
-0.1339
(0.0173)
-0.4028
(0.012)
-0.4675
(0.0157)
0.0184
(0.0091)
-0.0442
(0.0119)
1-prd. Lead
of Exit ×
Post-ref.
-0.1144
(0.0266)
0.1534
(0.0242)
0.1481
(0.0183)
2-prd. Lead
of Exit
-0.1321
(0.0136)
-0.129
(0.0179)
-0.3371
(0.0125)
-0.3589
(0.0165)
0.022
(0.0095)
0.0131
(0.0125)
2-prd. Lead
of Exit ×
Post-ref.
-0.0077
(0.0275)
0.0516
(0.0252)
0.021
(0.0191)
Year
Effects
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R² 0.0151 0.0153 0.0162 0.0169 0.0610 0.0610 0.1078 0.1086 0.0036 0.0038 0.0026 0.0038
N 76,261 76,261 56,025 56,025 88,690 88,690 65,398 65,398 88,690 88,690 65,398 65,398
Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The TFP variable is estimated as the residual from the regression in Column (4) of Table 3 and the
demand shock variable is estimated as the residual from the regression in Column (4) of Table 5.  Entry is a dummy which takes the value of one if
the plant entered that period and zero otherwise, and the one- and two-period lags are dummies that take the value of one if the plant entered last
period or two periods ago and zero otherwise.  A plant entered in period t if it reported positive production in period t but not in period t-1. Exit is a
dummy which takes the value of one if the plant exits this period and zero otherwise, and the one- and two-period leads are dummies that take the
value of one if the plant exits one or two periods ahead. A plant exited in period t if it reported positive production in period t but not in period t+1.